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Thoughts on River Elegy, June 1988-June 2011 
July 14, 2011 in Uncategorized by The China Beat | Permalink 
By David Moser 
I remember watching the legendary six-part CCTV miniseries River Elegy in my dorm room at 
Peking University in June of 1988—the last June in the Chinese historical calendar that would 
not have its 4th day permanently stained red. At the time I could not understand much of the 
stentorian voice-over (I was only a couple of years into my lifelong struggle with Chinese), but 
during the week the show was broadcast it became clear that the documentary had hit 
academic circles like an atomic bomb. The series’ content—a sweeping, brutally painful 
critique of the deep structure of Chinese culture—was the topic of conversation among many 
of the Peking University grad students I was hanging out with. They had seen nothing like it. 
“At last,” they would say to me, “a TV show that tells the truth (shuo shihua).” It was common 
to see handwritten postings discussing the documentary on the outdoor bulletin boards at 
Peking University’ssanjiaodi, “triangle area,” and informal discussion sessions on the topics of 
the program were organized at Tsinghua other universities throughout China. 
Seen by more than 200 million viewers, the miniseries also galvanized the general population. 
The People’s Daily actually published transcripts of River Elegy, and references to the themes 
of the documentary began popping up everywhere in the local newsstands. The show was 
screened by diverse political figures such as Yang Shangkun and Zhao Ziyang (who clearly 
approved of the heroic image the film had accorded him), and received both unexpected 
praise by reformers and predictable vilification by conservatives. The film was so popular with 
audiences that it was re-aired in August of the same year, though not before the State 
Administration of Radio, Film and Television (SARFT) edited out certain of the more political 
sensitive topics to appease warnings from certain Party officials, who were already spooked by 
the student demonstrations that had recently erupted in Shanghai and elsewhere. Despite the 
opposition and controversy, the series had actually initiated a relatively open public discussion 
on China’s future. 
More than two decades have gone by, and the once electrifying documentary now seems 
mostly a historical curiosity, often cited but rarely screened in the Chinese studies courses and 
history classes of the West. I recently downloaded and watched River Elegy again for the first 
time, and was surprised at how relevant it still is, even though China’s economy has morphed 
from the wobbly experiment it was during that summer of 1988 to an emerging 21st century 
powerhouse. But most of all I was struck by an obvious and disheartening realization: Despite 
the fact that the documentary was aired—twice!—in the turbulent 1980s, it could not be aired 
on CCTV in 2011. In spite of the unprecedented new information transparency and the buzz of 
the Internet and social media intruding at the peripheries of China’s media environment, the 
hallowed realm of the mainstream State television could not now tolerate anything like the 
blunt critique of River Elegy. 
Viewing the documentary again gives one a sense of the tragedy of missed 
opportunities. River Elegy occupies a point on a fleeting historical trajectory that fizzled in 
1989. It is a time-capsule relic of the chaotic but hopeful 1980s, when something like an 
honest dialogue between the leadership and the people seemed at least a possibility. A 
question is: How did such a program come to be aired in the first place? 
As Chinese documentaries go, River Elegy is an odd specimen, a fossil with no lineage. 
Audacious and even subversive in content, it is nevertheless presented in the staid, preachy 
and overblown style typical of much Chinese television fare. It is schlock CCTV melded with Lu 
Xun. The theme is ambitious; the attempt is to diagnose the longstanding sickness at the core 
of China’s tradition, to put Chinese culture “on the couch” and dredge up the demons and self-
deceptions of its past as a way of moving into the uncertain future of modernization. And, 
breaking the documentary mold, it presents its case not with chronologies, timelines and 
scholarly interviews, but rather draws on provocative metaphors and poetic images in a 
language that is at once impassioned, rhapsodic, and highly polemical. 
In answering the perennial question of how China in the Qing had fallen so far behind the 
western powers, the documentary paints its thesis in simple color metaphors, contrasting the 
“yellow” of the Yellow River and the Loess plain with the “blue” of the ocean, the sky, and the 
planet earth as viewed from outer space. The script makes use of the ready-made Chinese 
associations of the blue sea with foreign-ness (the word yang 洋, “ocean” being a standard 
adjective denoting “western”), and concomitant images of maritime trade, exploration, 
capitalist expansion and cultural vitality. By contrast, “yellow” in the documentary is linked 
with feudalism, conservatism, landlocked xenophobia, and decay. In particular, the Yellow 
River—muddy, turbulent, tyrannical—is repeatedly used in the documentary as the 
embodiment of all that is destructive and soul-killing in Chinese tradition. (“[China’s] old social 
ills are like the silt of the Yellow River which clogs up the watercourse, building up to a crisis.”) 
The humiliating dynamics of China’s initial contacts with the West are metaphorically 
conceptualized as a clash between these two primary colors: 
Between an expanding sky-blue civilization engaging in international trade and a yellow 
civilization wedded to an agricultural economy and a bureaucratic government, the collision 
was like mixing ice with hot coals. 
Salvation, the documentary tells us, lies in the new policies of economic reform. The course of 
the Yellow River, tracing the historical failures of China’s past, is now flowing to a more 
optimistic future, shown on the screen as images of Deng Xiaoping’s Shenzhen, the coastal 
SEZs characterized in the script as China finally opening up to the blue sea—literally and 
figuratively: “After 1,000 years of isolation the Yellow River finally sees the sky-blue ocean!” 
The extent of River Elegy’s sheer iconoclasm still has shock value. In addition to the Yellow 
River, some of China’s most beloved cultural symbols come under attack, even the 
unassailable Great Wall itself: 
Yet if somehow the Great Wall could speak, it would tell the descendants of the Chinese 
people that it is a huge monument to a tragedy created by historic destiny, that it cannot 
stand for strength, progress or glory, but only isolation, conservatism, and ineffective 
defenses. Because of its massiveness and longevity, it has rooted self-glorification, arrogance 
and self-deception into our national character. Oh, Great Wall, why should we still sing your 
praises? 
Again, it is very hard to imagine, in almost any context, CCTV sanctioning a sentiment like this 
on the airwaves today. Those of us in China accustomed to reading similar or much bolder 
statements daily on our computer screens should remember the context of River Elegy’s 
broadcast. For the Chinese citizens at that time, the effect of hearing such a message on one’s 
home TV was astounding for some, disorienting for others, and for still others positively 
exhilarating. 
As an American college student watching the program in my dorm room in 1988, what 
surprised me most was the treatment of Mao Zedong. This was certainly the only mention I 
had ever seen in the government-controlled media of two of the most sensitive chapters in the 
Mao era: the Great Leap Forward and the Cultural Revolution. Despite the fact the Party had 
already issued its report card on Mao—70% correct, 30% incorrect—nothing I had seen in the 
broadcast media or press had come as perilously close as this documentary to actually 
pointing a finger at Chairman Mao himself. Of course the finger-pointing was rather oblique, 
and often employed the cinematic technique of montage; that is, Mao’s image appears on the 
screen at certain moments when the voice-over announcer intones some of the more 
condemnatory lines from the script: 
From economic utopia to political crises, and finally to social chaos… [Footage of Mao during 
the Cultural Revolution, enthusiastic youth shouting “Mao Zhuxi wansui!”] …wasn’t this great 
historical tragedy the inevitable conclusion to this agricultural civilization? 
Why did our feudal period last so long? As long as the never-ending floods of the Yellow River? 
This is a longstanding nightmare. Many times China tried to bury feudalism for good. Yet it 
always seemed to die, but not to stiffen. [Sudden cut to scenes of the Red Guard holding high 
Mao’s book, Mao waving at the crowd.] 
The visual, visceral implication of such editing is that Mao had functioned as a quasi-emperor 
himself, merely continuing the ills of the dynastic system, rather than liberating China from it. 
At other points the accusations are more directly on target: 
During the mad years of the Great Leap Forward, myths about “the people’s great courage” 
and “the land’s huge bounty” greatly exaggerated the wheat yields of northern China, and rice 
yields in the south…Everyone from the great leader above [long shot of Mao’s statue being 
carried by adoring throngs], to the scientists, and the usually practically peasants below all 
believed these myths. 
To my knowledge, the Chinese were not to hear again such frank assessments of the Mao era 
in the mainstream media for the entire frozen decade that followed 1989. Even now, standard 
Chinese high school textbooks can go roughly this far in criticizing Mao, and no further. 
As television fare, the uncompromising academic timbre of the documentary also comes as an 
anomaly. The script was a collaborative effort by a team of writers and intellectuals, primarily 
journalist Su Xiaokang (who fled China after the 1989 incident), and to a great extent reflects 
the mood and style of the 1980s intelligentsia. Not exactly a populist diatribe, River 
Elegy wears its elitism on its sleeve. The intellectuals had finally gotten a chance to speak in 
the most public of venues, and they took advantage of it. The program indicts China’s shabby 
treatment of intellectuals (read also “dissidents”) and the undervaluing of education in 
general, which had resulted in a system that “asphyxiates the best and brightest of each 
generation.” Inverting the Party’s traditional elevation of the common people and the 
instinctive distrust of the intelligentsia, River Elegyinstead decries the resulting backwardness 
of the Chinese masses to an extent verging on outright condescension. The documentary 
lingers on unflattering images of rural farmers, grinning and gaping cretinously at some off-
camera spectacle, with uncomfortable close-ups on bad teeth and tawny skin, as the voiceover 
laments the Chinese people’s lack of suzhi, “personal quality, character.” (The echo of Bo 
Yang’s The Ugly Chinaman, popular at that time, can be felt here, and the same complaint can 
still be heard today from Beijing taxi drivers.) And if the common people are not idealized, the 
intellectuals are positively lionized, as the voice-over utters syrupy statements like “If only the 
intellectuals could sprinkle the sweet spring water of science and democracy onto the yellow 
soil!” 
Striking also, for an officially sanctioned documentary 1980s CCTV, was the unflinching 
characterization of the new reforms as capitalist in essence. That Deng’s experiment was 
merely capitalism was the common emperor’s-new-clothes observation at the time. Those who 
lived through the first years of Reform and Opening Up will remember that, despite Deng’s 
famous indifference to the color of cats, the Party theoreticians nevertheless had to jump 
through torturous hoops in order to make sense of Deng’s 180-degree turn, and to enable the 
Party’s still-official “socialist” label to retain its relevance, resulting in a disciplined discourse 
wherein the term “Socialist Market Economy with Chinese characteristics” was uttered like a 
one-word mantra. Though there is a perfunctory nod to the notion of the reforms as merely a 
revision of Marxist theory (a clip of Zhao Ziyang proclaiming that “a socialist planned 
commodity economy based on public ownership” represents “a major development of 
Marxism, the theoretical basis of our reform.”) for the most part, the script writers dispense 
with such theoretical niceties and call a spade a spade: 
Capitalism could not arise in China, but came from outside to bully it. 
Why has capitalism, the mark of modern industrial civilization, never taken hold in China? Why 
do the Chinese loathe it so? 
The documentary narrative, by equating capitalism with dynamism and progress, essentially 
engages in cheerleading for the reform agenda—whatever it might be called. There is also a 
passing cinematic reference to the fall of communism elsewhere, with the hint that China 
should be the next in line: 
The death knell for capitalism predicted by Marx has been late in sounding. The fabulous rise 
of industrialism in 200 years, although showing signs of ills, constantly renews itself. The 
socialist countries that broke loose from the weak links of imperialism earlier in the century 
now launch large-scale social reforms. [Scenes of Mikhail Gorbachev shaking hands with 
Ronald Reagan.] 
Gorbachev, it should be remembered, was a hero to the Chinese intelligentsia for his 
implementation of both perestroika and the glasnost reforms China lacked. Indeed, River 
Elegy came as close as any broadcast media ever had to openly calling for the economic 
restructuring to be complemented by openness and democratic reforms—the “Fifth 
Modernization” Wei Jingsheng had called for: 
It is gratifying to see that, following economic reform, we have finally begun to try political 
reform. Recently, someone dared for the first time to cast a dissenting vote at the People’s 
National Congress—not an easy thing to do. Who can say this is not progress? 
In retrospect, this is one of the boldest and most poignant lines in the script. Despite its 
eloquence, this question simply had no chance of reverberating in the vacuum that followed 
1989. 
Watching River Elegy brings on a sense of deja vu; the probing questions and themes of the 
program were nothing new. The documentary essentially revisits the soul-searching of the 
May 4th Movement. Even the words “Science and Democracy” appear repeatedly in the 
voiceover. The questions raised by the miniseries were the same ones I heard over and over 
again in the 1980s, at heated late night discussions around tables strewn with green beer 
bottles and chopsticks. River Elegy had now helped to transport these questions to the public 
sphere, opening the door to a new kind of relationship between the media and the people. 
How did such a documentary succeed in getting aired? Part of the reason was simply the 
zeitgeist of China in the 80s. The rapid economic changes had brought with them a sense of 
giddy possibility and uncertainty in all domains. Boundaries were questioned. Persons of 
authority like Fang Lizhi could stand in front of students on major campuses and bluntly state 
that China’s problems were largely the result of the CCP’s one-party hegemony. Newspapers 
and magazines had unprecedented (if sporadic) freedom to address political issues. In fact, as 
counterintuitive as it may seem, I have been told by many journalists, writers and former 
dissidents that, in terms of public discourse in Party-sanctioned media, the 1980s was a freer 
and more open time than right now. 
Another factor was the political dynamics of the time, namely the split in Party leadership. The 
genuinely reformist faction headed by Zhao Ziyang was opposed by skeptical conservative 
hard liners, resulting in a partial paralysis at the top of the leadership that translated into a 
fleeting period of almost miraculous openness. (The atypical constraint was most evident 
during the events leading up to Tiananmen chaos, perhaps culminating in the astonishing 
spectacle on May 18 of a pyjamas-clad hunger striker Wu’er Kaixi directly scolding Li Peng in 
the Great Hall of the People—all broadcast on CCTV!). Part of battleground was in the area of 
public support, and the compelling message of River Elegyconveniently served as a six-part TV 
advertisement for Zhao Ziyang and the reform agenda. For all its many flaws, the 
documentary marked a rare moment in modern Chinese history when the battle over policy 
was at least beginning to be waged in the court of public opinion. 
In the China of 2011, with roaring GDP and bullet trains, some of the documentary’s more 
painful historical questions of China’s backwardness have lost their edge. Yet the question at 
the heart of the documentary, and the deeper question involving China’s soul, is the question 
of human freedom. Despite twenty years of economic progress and soft-power campaigns, 
China still has a perceived problem in this area. Its “Liberation” has never produced a true 
liberation of the mind and spirit. River Elegy talks of cyclical eras of repression and decay, and 
episode five ends with the call “We must move on and break out of this vicious cycle of 
history.” It has been said that history does not repeat, but it does rhyme. It seems the 
Chinese government may be the exception; in stereotypical Chinese plagiarist fashion, it is 
guilty of literally repeating the history of the 80s, even to the point of arresting the same 
dissidents (such as Liu Xiaobo) for the same reasons. 
The government is faced with more than 100,000 mass demonstrations a year, and with the 
advent of the Internet and social media, there is talk of a tipping point. We know there are 
those in power who will look back at the 1980s and conclude that the events of 1989 were 
partially the result of increased freedoms typified precisely by statements such as River Elegy. 
This would be the wrong lesson to take from history. Go back and watch the documentary 
again. 
Further resources: 
The documentary River Elegy can be downloaded at Archive.org. 
There is also a reader’s guide to the documentary, Deathsong of the River by Su Xiaokang and 
Wang Luxiang, available at Amazon. 
Jeff Wasserstrom has written a piece examining the color symbolism of Chinese politics, much 
of which is directly relevant to this article. 
Finally, Geremie Barmé has some of the most definitive and insightful analysis of the 
documentary, and the Tiananmen Square movement as a whole. 
David Moser holds a Ph.D. from University of Michigan and is currently Academic Director at 
CET Chinese Studies, Beijing Capital Normal University. 
Be Sociable, Share! 	
